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New Zealand experienced two natural experiments with respect to state-provided social housing 
after 1990. First, while continuing to acquire new state houses, the National Government 
substantially reduced the overall state house stock by selling a greater number of houses either to 
existing tenants (through the Home Buy scheme) or, if the house was vacant, to other purchasers 
(vacant sales). From 1999, the Labour-led government ended homebuys, greatly reduced vacant 
sales and increased acquisitions, resulting in a major increase in the state house stock. We 
examine determinants of the spatial distribution of homebuys, vacant sales and acquisitions over 
the period 1991–2006, focusing on levels of, and changes in, local deprivation status and house 
prices as determinants. Having modelled the determinants of each category, we test whether 
homebuys, vacant sales, and acquisitions in an area over one five-year period had an effect on 
changes in local deprivation and house prices in the succeeding five-year period, after controlling 
for initial levels of, and prior changes in, deprivation and house prices. We find that state house 
acquisitions in an area led to a subsequent rise in local deprivation, consistent with the policy aim 
of providing housing to those most in need. While vacant sales had no material effects, a greater 
number of homebuys in an area led to increased local real house price appreciation over the 
subsequent five year period. This finding, based on the results of a politically-driven natural 
experiment, is consistent with the hypothesis that a scheme that transforms existing tenants into 
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During the 1990s and 2000s there were significant spatial changes in state housing density in 
New Zealand (Schrader, 2005). We use Housing New Zealand Corporation (HNZC) data, 
census data and Quotable Value New Zealand (QVNZ) housing data to investigate determinants 
and impacts of these spatial changes over 1991–2006. We investigate which area characteristics 
are systematically associated with sales and acquisitions of state houses, and whether HNZC 
sales and acquisitions led to subsequent changes in deprivation and house prices. 
Our analysis exploits two natural experiments driven by differing political philosophies. The 
National government, elected in 1990, had a focus on state house sales. As a result, they 
substantially reduced the size of the state housing portfolio, whilst ensuring housing stock was 
located principally in areas of high demand. There were three types of sales that occurred. First, 
state houses could be sold to tenants at market value under the Home Buy scheme. Vacant state 
houses could also be sold privately as a vacant sale and, in a few instances, large numbers of 
vacant houses were sold to one owner as a community partner sale. The Labour government, 
elected in November 1999, changed the direction of state house policy. They increased 
acquisitions, removed the Home Buy scheme and greatly reduced the number of vacant sales. 
We begin our analysis by examining the types of areas associated with differing levels of 
vacant sales, homebuys and acquisitions. Furthermore, we analyse determinants by house type: 
for example, comparing vacant sales of 1–2 bedroom state houses with vacant sales of 3+ 
bedroom state houses. We also explore the area characteristics associated with higher densities of 
state housing. 
Initially, we run pooled OLS regressions for each category (vacant sales, homebuys, and 
acquisitions) across three inter-censal periods. However, the coefficients are not stable across the 
three periods, reflecting the changing state housing policies. This leads to our cross sectional 
analysis where we examine the effect of deprivation and housing affordability on sales and 
acquisitions in an area. We also examine the effect of prior changes in these area characteristics 
to control for whether an area was already “improving” or not. We hypothesise that prospective 
purchasers prefer to purchase a state house in “better” neighbourhoods or ones that are “up-
and-coming” so as to preserve or enhance their investment. Thus we expect that both homebuys 
and vacant sales tended to occur in less deprived (and/or improving) areas. This tendency will be 
mediated by affordability issues, especially for existing state house tenants; thus we hypothesise 
that, ceteris paribus, a greater number of homebuys occurred in more affordable areas. Finally, 2 
 
we expect acquisitions to have occurred predominantly in more deprived areas where house 
prices are relatively low, so enabling the state to offer social housing to those most in need. 
Having determined the factors associated with vacant sales, homebuys and acquisitions we 
examine the impacts that HNZC sales and acquisitions had on the local area. First, we examine 
the effect that sales and acquisitions had on the subsequent change in deprivation level of an 
area. We then examine the effect that sales and acquisitions had on subsequent changes in local 
house prices. We expect areas which experience an increase in acquisitions to become more 
deprived and areas which experience a large percentage of homebuys to become less deprived. 
We also expect house prices to rise in areas which experience a large percentage of homebuys. 
This expectation reflects the hypothesis that a shift in the housing tenure status of an individual 
or household has an impact on those residents’ attachment and commitment to the community 
(DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Skilling, 2004 and 2005) and may lead to positive outcomes for 
issues such as crime (Sampson et al., 1997), immigration (Sinnings, 2010), outcomes for children 
(Green and White, 1997; Haurin et al., 2002; Mohantly and Raut, 2009), and general well-being 
(Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand, 2006).
 1
The Home Buy scheme is of particular use for examining whether a community experiences 
positive outcomes as a result of an exogenously sourced rise in the homeownership rate. By 
definition, the same residents remain in the house (at least initially) while their tenure status 
changes, since the Home Buy scheme was available only to a state house tenant who purchased 
the property in which they were already living. Our results for the impacts of the Home Buy 
scheme on the community therefore reflect a unique set of exogenous policy choices. Consistent 
with the literature on the hedonic pricing of houses, any impacts on the community of the 
scheme should be reflected in the area’s house prices which summarise the broader amenity 
value of an area. Thus our test of the impacts of homebuys on subsequent house price 
appreciation (after controlling for other existing and prior factors) is of particular interest for 
understanding the impacts of tenure status on community outcomes. 
  
Section 2 describes our datasets, their construction, application, and descriptive statistics. 
Section 3 describes the regression models used to examine the area characteristics associated 
with sales and acquisition patterns; section 4 presents and discusses the corresponding results; 
section 5 investigates whether HNZC sales and acquisitions led to subsequent changes in area 
outcomes; and Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
1 Some other studies suggest that homeownership may also have negative individual effects; for instance Oswald 
(1996, 1999) finds an increase in homeownership rates is associated with an increase in unemployment, while Ellis 
(2006) suggests that homeowners who concentrate their wealth in housing face more investment risk. 3 
 
 
2. Data Description 
2.1.  HNZC Data 
The HNZC dataset that we use is described fully in Olssen et al. (2010). It contains 
information on 80,983 state houses over the period January 1936 to February 2010. We use data 
from 1993 onwards, following the date at which HNZC started actively managing the houses.  
The dataset contains information regarding the acquisition dates of the properties and 
specific characteristics of the properties, such as the number of bedrooms and the type of 
property – for example whether the property was a single, double or multi unit building. The 
dataset also provides information on whether the properties were sold or destroyed, the sale 
prices and sale dates of the properties, and the type of sale. There were three sale types that 
occurred between 1993 and 2010. State houses could be sold to the current tenants under the 
Home Buy scheme, sold privately as a vacant sale, or sold to a community group as a 
Community Partner sale (Schrader, 2005; Olssen et al., 2010). 
As at 1 March 1993, there were 69,267 state houses in this dataset. In this paper we are 
interested in the acquisitions, vacant sales, and homebuys of state houses over the three inter-
censal periods: March 1991 to February 1996, March 1996 to February 2001, and March 2001 to 
February 2006. However, we do not have detailed data between 1991 and 1993. Given that there 
were very few sales and acquisitions between 1991 and 1993, the 1993 HNZC data is treated as if 
it corresponded to the 1991 census. Table 1 summarises the number of acquisitions, vacant sales, 
and homebuys for the three periods.
2
2.2.  Census Data 
 There were very few homebuys between 2001 and 2006, 
due to the Labour government terminating the Home Buy scheme when elected in late 1999.  
This paper uses data from the 1991, 1996, and 2001 censuses to calculate the total 
number of private dwellings in different geographical areas. Our analysis requires the calculation 
of each of the three categories – acquisitions, vacant sales, and homebuys – as a percentage of 
total private dwellings per geographical unit. The census data provides the number of private 
dwellings per meshblock and census area unit (CAU) for the corresponding year.
3
                                                 
2 Table 4 contains further descriptive data on acquisitions, vacant sales, and homebuys. 
 Using 
3 For example, the 1991 census provides data on 1991 CAUs and 1991 meshblocks. 4 
 




2.3.  Population Data 
 All descriptive statistics and results are presented at the CAU level. 
We use data from the 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006 censuses to generate population 
characteristic variables for each area; the data are fully documented in Stillman and Maré (2008).
6
These variables allow us to control for area characteristics as well as identifying what 
characteristics, if any, are systematically associated with higher or lower acquisitions, homebuys, 
and vacant sales. For instance, as discussed in the Introduction, three of the hypotheses of this 
project are that less deprived areas are associated with more vacant sales and more homebuys, 
while more deprived areas are associated with a greater number of acquisitions.  
 
Population and migrant counts are calculated for the usually resident population aged 18 and 
over in each geographical area, excluding individuals with missing information. Included in the 
population and migrant counts are all non-institutionalised adults. Table 2 summarises the mean 
characteristics of the population over the five censuses. 
2.4.  Housing Market Data 
The house sale price data comes from QVNZ. QVNZ maintains a dataset of all property 
sales that have occurred from 1982 onwards and provides data for several categories of 
residential dwellings. QVNZ has matched this dataset to census meshblocks and has made it 
available at the meshblock level on an annual basis. 
Stillman and Maré (2008)
7 use the QVNZ data to create average sale prices in each 
geographic area of residential dwellings
8 in each of the census years. They aggregate sales data in 
each meshblock up to census area units in two different ways. Firstly they weight by the 
population in each meshblock in that year, and secondly they weight by the number of sales in 




aggregated to CAU level weighted by the number of sales in each meshblock. 
                                                 
4 I.e. for CAUs defined consistently according to 2001 boundaries. 
5 We also considered analysis at the 58 and 140 labour market area (LMA) level (Newell and Papps, 2001). However, 
once further analysis was undertaken, both the LMA definitions were discarded as data is too aggregated to examine 
the determinants of the stock of state houses over time. A similar problem would result from using Territorial Local 
Authority or Regional Council boundaries, so we do not consider these spatial aggregations. 
6 See section 3.1, “Population Data”. 
7 See section 3.2, “Housing Market Data”. 
8 We have used residential dwellings defined as dwellings of a fully detached or semi-detached style on their own 
clearly defined piece of land.  
9 All variables that are expressed in 1991 dollars are deflated by the Consumer Price Index. 5 
 
2.5.  Deprivation Index 
The deprivation index compiled by Salmond et al. (2002) is calculated for each census 
year using a combination of census variables that reflect aspects of material and social 
deprivation. The deprivation index allocates each meshblock in New Zealand a deprivation 
score. The deprivation index is provided in two forms: the deprivation interval variable and the 
deprivation ordinal scale. The deprivation interval variable is the first principal component score, 
scaled to have a mean of 1000 index points and standard deviation of 100 index points. The 
ordinal scale, derived from the first principal component score, ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 
represents not deprived and 10 represents highly deprived.  
We are interested in examining the relationship between sales and acquisitions and the 
level of deprivation in an area. The Salmond et al. deprivation index is given at meshblock and 
CAU level for the corresponding census year but aggregation of this index to 2001 CAUs on a 
consistent basis is problematic. Since this is a generated index, we have conducted our own 
principal component analysis on a large number of census variables,
10
Table 3 summarises the correlations between the deprivation interval variable, our 
generated deprivation score, and the different area characteristics for 2001. While there are some 
area characteristics, such as the log of real income, that are highly correlated with the deprivation 
interval variable (and so could possibly be used as proxies for deprivation), if we were to use one 
of these variables as a proxy for deprivation, we would not be able to control for other area 
characteristics due to the presence of strong multicollinearity amongst the variables. Hence we 
use the generated deprivation score as our measure of CAU deprivation. 
 and use the first principal 
component score to generate our own measure of deprivation. Our generated deprivation score 
and the Salmond et al. deprivation interval variable (“NZDep 2001”) are highly correlated with a 
significant correlation coefficient of 0.818 in 2001. Figure 1 illustrates this strong positive 
correlation.  
2.6.  Data Creation 
This project requires the merging of the HNZC data, QVNZ data and census data, in 
order to model each sales/acquisitions category between each census as a percentage of initial 
                                                 
10 These variables include, for the local population: mean age, percent aged 65+ (omitted percent aged 18–64), 
percent female, percent with school qualifications, with post-school qualifications, with degree qualifications and 
with missing qualifications (omitted percent with no qualifications), percent unemployed or not in the labour force, 
percent married, in a de facto relationship, divorced/separated, widowed, and missing marital status (omitted non-
family), mean number of 0–4-, 5–12-, 13–17-, 18–24-, 25–64-, and 65+-year-olds in private dwellings, percent with 
zero or negative income, percent with missing income, percent European, percent Maori, percent Asian, percent 
Pacific Island, percent other ethnicity and the percent of migrants. 6 
 
private dwellings.
11 Vacant sales and homebuys are also calculated as a percentage of the initial 
state housing stock.
12
Our analysis examines the determinants of the spatial changes in state housing density by 
splitting the sales and acquisition categories into different house types. The house type categories 
include 1–2 bedroom state houses, 3+ bedroom state houses, single unit state houses and state 
houses of other property types.
 The HNZC dataset has information for 1,136 of the 2001 CAUs, whereas 
the census data contains information for all 1,859 CAUs. The 723 missing CAUs from the 
HNZC data is due to there being no state houses in these areas in 1993 and no state houses 
acquired in the areas after 1993. 
13 Table 4 summarises the mean state housing characteristics over 
the three census periods.
14
 Table 4 shows the large increase in both vacant sales and homebuys between 1996 and 
200,1 and the large decrease in each sales category between 2001 and 2006. These two periods 
pick up the effect of firstly the National government’s state housing policy followed by the 
change in state housing policy adopted by the Labour government. When looking at each 
category, the percentages relative to total private dwellings are very small, especially when each 
category is split into different house types. However, as a proportion of the initial state housing 
stock, some of the sales proportions are material. For instance, over 1996–2001, almost 16% of 
initial state houses were sold as vacant sales and a further 4% as homebuys.  
 We split each category to examine the area characteristics associated 
with higher or lower sales/acquisitions of state houses of different sizes and styles. 
Table 4 also shows the number of sales of each sub-category expressed as a percentage 
of initial state housing stock of that sub-category.
15
                                                 
11 Private dwellings include any permanent or temporary dwelling that is occupied by a private household. It 
includes privately owned and state owned houses and flats, but excludes institutional dwellings. 
 For the period 1996–2001, nearly one fifth of 
single unit state houses were sold as vacant sales and a further 6% as homebuys, whereas only 
9% of other property type state houses were sold as vacant sales and only a further 1.5% as 
homebuys. Also a greater proportion of larger state houses (3+ bedrooms) were sold than 
smaller state houses (1–2 bedrooms). From 1996 to 2001, 17% of 3+ bedroom houses were sold 
as vacant sales and a further 6% as homebuys, compared with 15% of 1-2 bedroom houses sold 
12 We do not calculate acquisitions as a percentage of initial state housing stock as these percentages would be 
misleading for those area units which began with few or no state houses.  
13 Other property type includes state houses that are double unit, multi unit, bedsitter, complex, duplex unit and star 
flat.  
14 The means presented in table 4 are weighted by the total number of private dwellings in each geographical area 
unit. 45% of vacant sales were 1–2 bedroom state houses (55% were 3+ bedroom); 71% of vacant sales were single 
unit state houses (29% were other property type). 28% of homebuys were 1–2 bedroom state houses; 90% of 
homebuys were single unit state houses. 43% of acquisitions were 1–2 bedroom state houses; 59 % of acquisitions 
were single unit state houses. 
15 E.g. the number of 1–2 bedroom vacant sales over 1996–2001 as a percentage of the number of 1–2 bedroom 
state houses in 1996. 7 
 
as vacant sales and 2.5% as homebuys. These figures imply that prospective purchasers of state 
houses may have preferred to purchase larger, standalone houses; alternatively these houses may 
have been located in more affordable or more desirable areas. Our statistical analysis sheds light 
on competing reasons for the differing sale propensities. 
3. Determinants of Sales, Acquisitions and State Housing Stock 
In this section, we summarise our models for the determinants of the spatial distribution 
of vacant sales, homebuys, and acquisitions. Discussion of results follows in section 4. 
We carry out panel regressions across areas and across censuses as a function of area 
characteristics, testing for varying coefficients across time. We then carry out cross sectional 
regressions for the three periods, determining whether the effects of area characteristics differ 
over time and the extent to which they do. 
We model each sales/acquisition category in a number of different ways for areas 
defined according to 2001 CAU boundaries. First, we model the sales/acquisition category 
between each census as a percentage of the initial total private dwellings.
16 We then model the 
sales categories (vacant sales and homebuys) between each census as a percentage of the initial 
state housing stock.
17
3.1.  Panel Data Regressions 
 We also model the spatial characteristics of the state housing stock itself. 
We initially run panel regressions to examine the effect that the different area 
characteristics
18
(Acquisitions as % of total private dwellings) CAU,((t + 5) – t) = α + βt(State Housing Stock as % of 
total private dwellings)CAU, t + θt(area characteristics)CAU, t + eCAU,t       (1) 
 have on the sales and acquisitions of state houses over the census periods. We 
test whether the effect of each area characteristic is stable over time. Equations (1) and (2) 
illustrate the first set of panel regressions and the subsequent statistical tests undertaken. We 
have allowed for area and time fixed effects and clustered the standard errors on CAUs.  
Where  e CAU, t = µCAU + τt + ε CAU, t   , t = 1991, 1996, 2001   
Wald test: 
H0: θt = θ , for t = 1991, 1996, 2001 
                                                 
16 For example, sales/acquisition category as a percentage of 1996 total private dwellings for the 1996–2001 
sales/acquisitions. 
17 For example, 1991–1996 vacant sales as a percentage of the 1991 stock of state houses. 
18 The area characteristics are the same as the census area characteristics used in the principal component analysis 
plus the log of median real house sale prices. 8 
 
HA: θt is not constant overtime  
 
(Sales as % of total private dwellings) CAU,((t + 5) – t) = α + βt(State Housing Stock as % of total 
private dwellings)CAU, t + θt(area characteristics)CAU, t + eCAU,t        (2) 
Where   e CAU, t = µCAU + τt + ε CAU, t   , t = 1991, 1996, 2001   
Wald test: 
H0: θt = θ , for t = 1991, 1996, 2001 
HA: θt is not constant over time 
 
Equation (2) is run separately for vacant sales and homebuys. Due to the small 
percentage of sales occurring between 2001 and 2006, we have run panel regressions for 
homebuys and vacant sales between just 1991 and 2001. Similarly, we have run a panel regression 
for acquisitions only considering the period 1996–2006.  
Finally we run similar regressions for each sales category defined as a percentage of initial 
state housing stock, where we do not include the percentage of initial state housing stock as an 
explanatory variable. Equation (3) represents this specification. We also run Equation (3) just for 
t = 1991, 1996. 
(Sales as % of initial state housing stock) CAU,((t + 5) – t) = α + θt(area characteristics)CAU, t + eCAU,t 
(3) 
Where  e CAU, t = µCAU + τt + ε CAU, t   , t = 1991, 1996, 2001   
Wald test: 
H0: θt = θ , for t = 1991, 1996, 2001 
HA: θt is not constant over time 
 
In all of the panel regressions covering all three periods we reject the null hypothesis of 
constant coefficients across time. When we run regressions covering just two periods, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis for four of the regressions but do reject stable coefficients for one of 
the regressions.
 19
                                                 
19 The exception is vacant sales defined as a percentage of total private dwellings over 1991–2001, where we can 
reject stable coefficients across the two periods. 
 The rejections of constant coefficients across the three periods reflect the 9 
 
different policies adopted by the National and Labour governments during this time. The 
absence of stable coefficients over time leads to our cross sectional analysis, examining the 
models for each census period individually.  
 
3.2.  Cross Sectional Regressions 
We analyse the determinants of each of the sales/acquisition categories over each of the 
census periods separately using cross sectional regressions. In contrast to the panel regressions, 
we do not include the individual census area characteristics as left hand side variables. Instead we 
use our generated deprivation score, and by doing so, eliminate the problems associated with 
multicollinearity existing between the census variables. 
Our first cross sectional regressions investigate the effect that deprivation has on the 
sales and acquisitions for each census period. Each regression is a function of our generated 
deprivation score, the initial state housing stock (as a proportion of total dwellings) and the 
change in the deprivation score between the prior two censuses.
20
(Sales or Acquisitions as % of total private dwellings)CAU, (t+5) - t =  α + β(State Housing Stock)CAU, t  
 We include the change in 
deprivation to get a measure of whether the area was already ‘improving’ or not. This 
specification is shown in Equation (4). 
+ λ(Dep_Score)CAU, t + δ(ΔDep_Score)CAU , t + eCAU, t          (4) 
Secondly, we are interested in determining if there exists a relationship between the 
median house price in an area and the number of sales and acquisitions in that area. We do this 
in two ways. Firstly, we supplement Equation (4) with the inclusion of the log of real median 
house price and the prior change in the log of real median house price. In some circumstances, 
the change in house price over the previous five years may be a better indicator of whether 
house prices are seen to be “expensive” for the area, since this variable abstracts from the 
influence of unchanging natural amenities, such as views, coastal location or proximity to the 
city. This specification is shown in Equation (5). 
(Sales or Acquisitions as % of total private dwellings)CAU, (t+5) - t = α + β(State Housing  
Stock)CAU,t + λ(Dep_Score)CAU, t + δ(ΔDep_Score)CAU, t + θln(houseprice)CAU, t +  
 φ (Δln(houseprice))CAU, t + eCAU, t              (5) 
Alternatively, instead of using the log of real median house prices, we use the log of the 
ratio of real median house prices to real income in an area to examine the effect that house price 
                                                 
20 Thus ΔDep_ScoreCAU,t ≡ Dep_ScoreCAU,t – Dep_ScoreCAU,t-5 where t is measured in years. 10 
 
affordability (relative to local incomes) has on sales and acquisitions. Given spatial differences in 
both house prices and incomes across the country (with both variables generally being higher in 
Auckland and Wellington than other parts of New Zealand), we place most emphasis on the 
results of Equation (6), which includes house prices in a manner that accounts for differences in 
incomes across areas.  
(Sales or Acquisitions as % of total private dwellings)CAU, (t+5) - t = α + β(State Housing  
Stock)CAU, t +  λ(Dep_Score)CAU, t + δ(ΔDep_Score) CAU, t + θln(houseprice/income)CAU, t 
+ φ (Δln(houseprice/income))CAU, t + eCAU, t           (6) 
Finally we run each of the cross sectional regressions for the two sales categories. 
However, this time each category is defined as the percentage of the initial state housing stock 
and we do not include the initial level of state housing stock as a right hand side variable. These 
specifications are shown in Equations (7), (8), and (9). 
(Sales as % of state housing stock)CAU, (t+5) - t =  α +λ(Dep_Score)CAU, t + δ(ΔDep_Score)CAU, t +  
          eCAU, t            (7) 
(Sales as % of state housing stock)CAU, (t+5) - t =  α +  λ(Dep_Score)CAU, t +  δ(ΔDep_Score)CAU, t +
    θln(houseprice)CAU, t + φ (Δln(houseprice))CAU, t + eCAU, t      (8) 
(Sales as % of state housing stock)CAU, (t+5) - t =  α + λ(Dep_Score)CAU, t +  δ(ΔDep_Score)CAU, t +
     θln(houseprice/income)CAU, t + φ (Δln(houseprice/income))CAU, t + eCAU, t  (9) 
Again we place most emphasis on the results from Equation (9) where we control for 
house prices relative to local incomes. If we are interested primarily in the determinants of the 
likelihood of a sale within a given set of state houses, we consider the results from Equation (9), 
whereas the results from Equation (6) are more useful if we are primarily interested in the type of 
area in which state houses are sold or acquired. 
3.3.  Determinants of Sales by House Type 
We examine the spatial distribution of vacant sales and homebuys by house type. For 
each vacant sale and homebuy type (defined as a percentage of state housing stock of that type) 
we run two regressions, estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs). The first set of 
SURs separates vacant sales and homebuys into 1–2 bedroom state houses and 3+ bedroom 
state houses. The second set of SURs separates the two sales categories into single unit state 
houses and other property type state houses. Each SUR is a function of the deprivation level, the 
change in the deprivation level between the prior two censuses, real house prices relative to 
income, and the change in real house prices relative to income between the two prior censuses. 11 
 
These specifications are shown in Equations (10) and (11). Each SUR is run for the period 
1996–2001 as it is in these periods when the majority of sales of each sub-category occurred. 
SUR 1: 
(Sales of 1-2 bedroom state houses as % of stock of 1-2 bedroom state houses)CAU, (t+5) - t  = α1 + 
  β1(Dep_Score)CAU, t +  δ1(ΔDep_Score)CAU, t + θ1ln(houseprice/income)CAU, t + 
  φ1(Δln(houseprice/income))CAU, t + eCAU, t     
(Sales of 3+ bedroom state houses as % of stock of 3+ bedroom state houses)CAU, (t+5) - t =  α2 + 
  β2(Dep_Score)CAU, t +  δ2(ΔDep_Score)CAU, t + θ2ln(houseprice/income)CAU, t + 
  φ2(Δln(houseprice/income))CAU, t + eCAU, t   
                      (10) 
SUR 2: 
(Sales of single unit state houses as % of stock of single unit state houses)CAU, (t+5) - t  = α1 + 
  β1Dep_Score)CAU, t +  δ1(ΔDep_Score) CAU, t + θ1ln(houseprice/income)CAU, t + 
  φ1(Δln(houseprice/income))CAU, t + eCAU, t     
(Sales of other state houses as % of stock of other state houses)CAU, t =  α2 + β2(Dep_Score)CAU, t + 
   δ2(ΔDep_Score)CAU, t + θ2ln(houseprice/income)CAU, t + φ2(Δln(houseprice/income))CAU, t 
  + eCAU, t                   (11) 
For each set of SURs, we conduct two Wald tests shown below. The first test determines 
whether the effect of each explanatory variable, other than the constant, is the same for each 
sub-category. The second test determines whether the underlying propensity to purchase a state 
house, given by the constant term, is different for each sub-category given the other 
determinants. 
Wald Tests: 
1)  H0: β1 - β2 = 0    HA: the coefficients are not constant across sub-categories 
δ1 – δ2 = 0 
θ1 - θ2 = 0 
φ1 - φ2 = 0 
 
2)  H0: α1 - α2 = 0    HA: the coefficients are not constant across sub-categories 
β1 - β2 = 0 
δ1 – δ2 = 0 
θ1 - θ2 = 0 
φ1 - φ2 = 0 
 12 
 
3.4.  Determinants of the State Housing Stock 
Finally, we examine the area characteristics of the stock of state houses over time. We 
model the stock of state houses as a proportion of total private dwellings,
21
Firstly we run a panel regression exploring the determinants of the stock of state houses 
over time. We test for area and time fixed effects and clustered the standard errors on CAUs. 
Equation (12) illustrates this regression and the statistical tests undertaken. 
 carrying out both 
panel regressions and cross sectional regressions over the three census periods. 
(State housing stock as % of total private dwellings)CAU, t =  
α + θt(area characteristics)CAU, t + eCAU,t             (12) 
Where e CAU, t = µCAU + τt + ε CAU, t    ,  t = 1991, 1996, 2001 
Wald test: 
H0: θt = θ , for t = 1991, 1996, 2001 
HA: θt is not constant over time 
We reject the null hypothesis of constant coefficients across time, leading to our cross sectional 
analysis. 
Our cross sectional regressions are shown in Equations (13), (14) and (15). We do not 
include the change in explanatory variables between the two prior censuses as we are examining 
the determinants of a stock variable, not a flow variable. 
(State housing stock as % of state housing stock)CAU, t = α + β (Dep_Score)CAU, t+ eCAU, t (13) 
 
(State housing stock as % of state housing stock)CAU, t = α + β (Dep_Score)CAU, t  
+ λ ln(houseprice)CAU, t + eCAU, t              (14) 
 
(State housing stock as % of total private dwellings)CAU, t = α + β (Dep_Score)CAU, t  
+ λ(ln(houseprice/income))CAU, t + eCAU, t            (15) 
                                                 
21 For example, the stock of state houses in 1996 is modelled as a percentage of the total number of private 
dwellings in 1996. 13 
 
4. Discussion of Results 
4.1.  Acquisitions 
From Tables 5, 6 and 7, corresponding to equations (4), (5) and (6), there appears to be a 
strong relationship between acquisitions (as a percentage of total private dwellings) and the 
deprivation level of an area over the three census periods. There does not, however, appear to be 
a consistent relationship between acquisitions and the prior change in the deprivation level of an 
area. Our results suggest that a greater percentage of acquisitions occurred in deprived areas 
relative to non deprived areas. This is consistent with both the National and Labour 
governments’ intentions of increasing state housing stocks in areas of high demand, those 
generally being deprived areas. However, Olssen et al. (2010) documented that during the 2000’s, 
increases in state housing density were witnessed in both (initially) non deprived and deprived 
areas. The relatively non deprived areas were most likely to be on the outskirts of urban areas 
with initially low population densities and, hence, given little weighting in the regression analysis. 
For example, between 2000 and 2009, large state housing increases occurred in initially relatively 
non deprived areas such as Henderson, Albany and east of East Tamaki – areas all on the 
outskirts of Auckland city.
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From Tables 6 and 7 one can estimate the effect that house prices in an area have on 
acquisitions. Ignoring the results for the period 1991–1996 (as only 3% of acquisitions occurred 
during this time), our results indicate a strong, consistent relationship between house prices and 
acquisitions. Table 6 suggests that a greater percentage of acquisitions occurred in areas with 
more expensive houses. The interpretation of the coefficient for the period 2001–2006 is as 
follows: a 10% increase in real median house prices in an area in 2001 is associated with an 
approximate 0.06 percentage point increase in acquisitions relative to total private dwellings in 
that area during 2001–2006. Table 7 suggests that a greater percentage of acquisitions occurred 
in areas with more expensive houses relative to income. The interpretation of the coefficient for 
the period 2001–2006 is as follows: a 10% increase in real house prices relative to real income in 
an area in 2001 is associated with an approximate 0.08 percentage point increase in acquisitions 
in that area during 2001–2006. 
 
This unexpected relationship between acquisitions and house prices may be partly 
explained by the large number of acquisitions occurring in the outskirts of urban areas. It is most 
likely that these fringe urban areas, on average, would (initially) have more expensive houses 
compared to urban areas with high densities of state housing. However, given that our results 
                                                 
22 Olssen et al. (2010). 14 
 
suggest more acquisitions occurred in deprived areas, one would expect that house prices, on 
average, would be cheaper in these areas. Table 3 shows only a weak negative correlation 
between our measure of deprivation and house prices, likely reflecting the prevalence of deprived 
areas in Auckland, which has high prices relative to other parts of New Zealand. This “Auckland 
effect” reinforces the positive relationship between acquisitions and house prices.  
Our results also suggest a weaker relationship between acquisitions and the prior change 
in house prices in an area. Placing greater emphasis on the results for the period 2001–2006 (as 
67% of acquisitions occur in this time), our results from Table 6 suggest that during this period, 
a greater percentage of acquisitions occurred in areas where house prices were falling, and, from 
Table 7, a greater percentage of acquisitions occurred in areas where house prices were falling 
relative to income. These results are consistent with an increased number of acquisitions in 
fringe urban areas, in which house prices may have started to fall due to the rising state housing 
density. As noted in section 3, the change in the house price variables may be of more relevance 
to our analysis than the house price level variables. In addition to controlling for unchanging 
amenities the change variables also effectively control for any “Auckland effect” that may 
influence our results. Given this interpretation, having controlled for such unchanging amenity 
and location effects, acquisitions over 2001–2006 predominately occurred in relatively 
inexpensive areas, consistent with our hypothesis. 
4.2.  Vacant Sales 
From Tables 5, 6 and 7 there appears to be a strong, inverse relationship between the 
number of vacant sales (as a percentage of total private dwellings) in an area and the deprivation 
level of an area.
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From Tables 6 and 7 there appears to exist an inverse relationship between house prices 
and vacant sales; however, there does not appear to be an obvious relationship between the 
change in house prices and vacant sales. The results for the period 1996–2001 are likely to be the 
most useful as this is when the majority of vacant sales occurred. The interpretation of the 
(levels) coefficient from Table 6 suggests a 10% higher real median house price in an area in 
 This is in accordance with the National government’s stated intention of 
decreasing state housing density in less deprived areas (e.g. Orakei and Mission Bay). There does 
not, however, appear to be a strong relationship between the percentage of vacant sales and the 
change in deprivation of an area. One possible reason is that the non deprived areas in which the 
majority of vacant sales occurred have always been relatively affluent (so having little or no 
change in deprivation), especially areas such as Orakei and Mission Bay. 
                                                 
23 Ignoring results for period 2001-2006 as only 6% of vacant sales occurred during this time. 15 
 
1996 is associated with a 0.04 percentage point decrease in vacant sales relative to total private 
dwellings in that area during 1996–2001. The interpretation from Table 7 suggests a 10% higher 
real median house price relative to real income in an area in 1996 is associated with a 0.08 
percentage point decrease in vacant sales in that area during 1996–2001.  
Tables 8, 9 and 10, corresponding to Equations (7), (8) and (9), all suggest similar results 
when examining the effect of deprivation on vacant sales (expressed as a percentage of initial 
state housing stock) in an area. A greater number of vacant sales occurred in less deprived areas 
and, once house prices are controlled for, there does not appear to be a relationship between the 
change in deprivation and the percentage of vacant sales.  
The results in Table 10 show evidence of an inverse relationship between vacant sales 
and house prices relative to income. The interpretation of the 1996–2001 coefficient is as 
follows: a 10% higher real median house price in an area relative to real income in 1996 led to an 
approximate 0.6 percentage point decrease in vacant sales relative to the state housing stock in 
that area between 1996 and 2001.  
It is important to distinguish between the results presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7 versus 
those presented in Tables 8, 9, and 10. When the sales category is defined as a percentage of 
initial total dwellings, the question we are examining is: Given the state housing stock in each 
area, would we expect to see a greater number of state house sales in one area compared to 
another based on area characteristics? When the sales category is defined as a percentage of 
initial state housing stock the question we are now examining is: Would we expect a greater 
percentage of initial state houses sold in one area compared to another? Thus, the results in 
Tables 8, 9 and 10 are examining what area characteristics determine where people are more 
likely to purchase a state house, whereas Tables 5, 6 and 7 examine the trends of the state 
housing sales and acquisitions across different areas.  
Our results in Tables 5, 6 and 7 suggest there were a greater number of vacant sales in 
areas of low deprivation with low house prices. Our results presented in Tables 8, 9 and 10 
suggest a greater percentage of initial state houses were sold as vacant sales in areas of low 
deprivation where house prices were low relative to income. 
4.3.  Homebuys 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 show a strong inverse relationship between homebuys and deprivation. 
Our results suggest that a greater number of homebuys (as a percentage of total private 
dwellings) occurred in less deprived areas consistent with our hypothesis. There does not appear 
to be a consistent relationship between the number of homebuys and the change in deprivation 16 
 
(paying particular attention to 1996–2001 results, as this is when the majority of homebuys 
occurred). Thus, evidence of whether the area was improving or not does not seem to affect the 
level of homebuys in an area.  
House prices appear to impact negatively on the percentage of homebuys in an area, but 
only to a small degree. Table 6 suggests that a 10% higher real median house price in an area in 
1996 led to an approximate 0.006 percentage point decrease in homebuys relative to total private 
dwellings in that area between 1996 and 2001. For the same period, the results in Table 7 suggest 
a 10% higher real house price relative to income in 1996 led to an approximate 0.01 percentage 
point decrease in homebuys during 1996–2001. Our results also suggest that areas in which real 
house prices were increasing (and real house prices relative to real income were increasing) 
during 1991–1996 saw fewer homebuys during 1996–2001. These results accord with our 
hypothesis that many existing residents of state houses were less able to purchase in areas where 
house prices, on average, were higher. 
The results presented in Tables 8, 9 and 10 also show a significant, inverse relationship 
between homebuys and deprivation. The results suggest that a greater number of homebuy sales 
(expressed as a percentage of initial state housing stock) occurred in less deprived areas. Also, 
placing greater emphasis on the results from 1996–2001, one observes that areas which were 
already improving (in terms of deprivation) during 1991–1996 witnessed a greater number of 
homebuys relative to their state housing density. 
There does not appear to be a relationship between the level of house prices in an area 
and the number of homebuys (as a percentage of initial state housing stock) in an area. However, 
our results suggest that areas in which house prices had fallen (and areas where house prices had 
fallen relative to income) during 1991–1996 witnessed a greater percentage of homebuys during 
1996–2001. Thus, homebuys were more prevalent in areas that had become relatively more 
affordable over time. Again, this result is in accordance with our hypothesis.  
Overall the results in Tables 5, 6 and 7 suggest there were a greater number of homebuys 
in non deprived areas with low house prices, and where house prices (and housing affordability) 
in the past had fallen. In Tables 8, 9 and 10 our results suggest a greater percentage of initial state 
houses were sold as homebuys in less deprived areas that were improving, and where house 
prices (and housing affordability) in the recent past had fallen. 
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4.4.  Discussion of Results by State House Type 
4.4.1.  Vacant Sales 
The results from Table 4 suggest that a greater proportion of 3+ bedroom state houses 
were sold as vacant sales compared to the proportion of 1–2 bedroom state houses; however, the 
difference is relatively small. From the Wald test in Table 11, corresponding to Equation (10), we 
cannot reject either of the null hypotheses. Thus, there is no evidence suggesting that the 
determinants of the likelihood of a vacant sale are different for state houses of different sizes, 
and there is also no evidence that investors had a higher propensity to purchase larger houses.  
Table 4 also shows that a greater proportion of single unit state houses were sold as 
vacant sales compared to other property types. In Table 12, we reject the null hypotheses of both 
Wald tests, indicating that the determinants of sale type differ between single unit and other state 
house types and that investors had a higher propensity to purchase single unit state houses than 
other property types. In interpreting the estimates for vacant sales of single unit state houses, our 
results in Table 14 suggest investors preferred to purchase single unit state houses in less 
deprived areas where house prices relative to income had fallen over 1991–1996.  
4.4.2.  Homebuys 
Table 4 indicates that a 3+ bedroom house was more likely to be sold as a homebuy than 
a 1–2 bedroom house. Furthermore, the rejection of both null hypotheses in Tables 11 and 12 
shows that, firstly, the determinants of homebuy purchase decisions differed across house type 
and, secondly, residents had a higher propensity to purchase larger houses. Our results in Table 
11 suggest that residents of both 1-2 bedroom and 3+ bedroom state houses were more likely to 
purchase their house if they lived in a less deprived area; however, the effect of deprivation on 
homebuys of 1–2 bedroom state houses was not as strong as for 3+ bedroom houses. Residents 
of 3+ bedroom houses were also more likely to buy in an area where house prices had fallen 
relative to income over the past five years (1991-1996). 
Table 4 shows a much greater proportion of single unit state houses were sold as 
homebuys compared to other property types. Again, determinants of purchase decisions across 
the two house types are shown to differ given the rejection of the null hypothesis in the first 
Wald test. The much larger constant term for single unit relative to other homebuys indicates 
that residents had a higher propensity to purchase single unit state houses compared to other 
property types, even after controlling for other determinants. Placing greater emphasis on 
homebuys for single unit state houses, our results in Table 12 suggest that residents preferred to 18 
 
purchase single unit state houses in areas that were less deprived and where house prices relative 
to income had fallen over 1991–1996. These results are consistent with homebuys of 3+ 
bedroom state houses and homebuys of all state houses. 
4.5.  State Housing Stock 
Finally we examine the characteristics of the spatial distribution of the stock of state houses. 
There is a strong, consistent relationship between the density of state housing in an area and the 
deprivation level of the area over each of the four census years covered by this study (Tables 13, 
14 and 15). As expected, our results suggest that the more deprived the area, the higher the 
density of state housing. Secondly, the effect of deprivation on the density of state houses 
increases over 1991–1996 and falls over 1996–2006. These trends are most likely explained by 
the two different political parties in power over this time. The 1990s National government 
placed a greater emphasis on reducing state house holdings in high priced areas and strategically 
locating state housing in areas of high demand. As a result, during the 1990s less deprived areas 
witnessed a decline in state housing density. The Labour government, having the aim of 
increasing the overall state housing stock, increased state housing density in both deprived and 
(initially) non-deprived areas, albeit with a greater concentration on areas of high demand. 
From Tables 14 and 15 there does not appear to be a strong, consistent relationship between 
state housing density in an area and house prices in an area. This is most likely because the 
majority of the stock of state houses were acquired many decades ago. The areas in which state 
houses were initially acquired were most likely then to have been fringe urban with relatively low 
house prices. However, as population grew and cities expanded, it is likely that these areas were 
no longer on the outskirts and house prices changed in relative value. 
4.6.  Auckland Results 
All the results estimated and presented for New Zealand (Tables 5–15) have also been 
estimated for just the Auckland Region, so abstracting from influences that may differ across 
regions. We have done so because we wish to test, in section 5, the impacts of state house sales 
and acquisitions at the both the national level and at a regional level for Auckland (New 
Zealand’s dominant city). Prior to doing so, we need to understand which variables we must 
control for in order to isolate the impacts of the sales and acquisitions variables on deprivation 
and house price outcomes. For Auckland, we find consistent relationships between deprivation 
and the level of sales and acquisitions as we did across New Zealand. House price determinants 
of sales and acquisitions in some cases differ for Auckland relative to New Zealand. However, 
we find that house prices are still a significant determinant for sales and acquisitions within 19 
 
Auckland. Thus, in section 5, it remains important to control for both deprivation and house 
prices, and prior changes in those variables, when looking at the effects of sales and acquisition 
policies on outcomes. 
5. Impacts of HNZC Sales and Acquisitions 
Previous studies, cited in the Introduction, have investigated the impact of 
homeownership on societal outcomes. The difficulty in such studies is to isolate an exogenous 
event that causes a switch in tenure status from tenant to homeowner (or vice versa). The state 
house sales programme in New Zealand, driven by political philosophy, is one such exogenous 
event, especially in the way that the Home Buy scheme enabled existing state house tenants to 
purchase their existing residence, an option which previously had been denied to them. We 
investigate whether an increase in acquisitions, vacant sales and, in particular, homebuys led to 
subsequent changes in deprivation and house prices in an area. The house price outcomes are 
used as a market-based summary measure of community wellbeing or amenity values. We 
concentrate on the impacts of sales and acquisitions conducted over the 1996–2001 period since 
the bulk of sales occurred over this period and the period also saw sizeable acquisition activity. 
5.1.  Regression Specifications 
First, we examine the impact of sales and acquisitions of state houses during 1996–2001 
on the change in deprivation of an area over 2001–2006. We regress the change in deprivation 
between 2001 and 2006 on vacant sales, acquisitions and homebuys over 1996–2001, each 
expressed as a percentage of total private dwellings in 1996. We control for the level of 
deprivation in 2001, the level of real median house price in 2001 and the changes in deprivation 
and real median house price between 1996 and 2001, and 1991 and 1996. This specification is 
shown in Equation (16). We then run a similar regression; however, this time we use real median 
house price relative to income as a control for house prices in an area. Both of these regressions 
are run for all of New Zealand and for the Auckland Region to examine consistency of results.  
(ΔDeprivation)CAU, 2006-2001 = α + θ1(Vacant Sales as % of total private dwellings)96-01 + 
θ2(Homebuys as % of total private dwellings)96-01 + θ3(Acquisitions as % of total private 
dwellings)96-01 + β1 (Dep_Score)CAU, 2001 + β2 (ΔDep_Score)CAU, 2001-1996 + 
β3(ΔDep_Score)CAU, 1996-1991 + λ1(ln(houseprice))CAU, 2001 + λ2(Δln(houseprice))CAU, 2001-1996 + 
λ3(Δln(houseprice))CAU, 1996-1991 + eCAU             (16) 
We then examine the effect of sales and acquisitions on the change in real house prices 
and real house prices relative to income in an area. First, we regress the change in real median 20 
 
house prices over 2001–2006 on vacant sales, homebuys and acquisitions over 1996–2001 as a 
percentage of total private dwellings. We control for the same explanatory variables as in 
Equation (16). We then run a similar regression, but using the change in real house prices relative 
to income between 2001 and 2006 as our explanatory variable. Again, we run these regressions 
for all of New Zealand and just for the Auckland Region to examine the consistency of results 
obtained across regions with those obtained within a single major region.  
   Δln(houseprice)CAU, 2006-2001 = α + θ1(Vacant Sales as % of total private dwellings)96-01 + 
θ2(Homebuys as % of total private dwellings)96-01 + θ3(Acquisitions as % of total private 
dwellings)96-01 + β1 (Dep_Score)CAU, 2001 +   β2 (ΔDep_Score)CAU, 2001-1996 + 
β3(ΔDep_Score)CAU, 1996-1991 + λ1(ln(houseprice))CAU, 2001 + λ2(Δln(houseprice))CAU, 2001-1996 + 
λ3(Δln(houseprice))CAU, 1996-1991 + eCAU             (17)  
5.2.  Discussion of Results 
As expected, the results for New Zealand in Tables 16 and 17, corresponding to 
Equation (16), indicate that an increase in acquisitions over 1996–2001 is associated with a 
subsequent increase in deprivation over 2001–2006. This result is also apparent for Auckland 
when using house prices as an explanatory variable but not when using house prices relative to 
incomes. Contrary to our hypothesis, the New Zealand results suggest that an increase in 
homebuys in an area during 1996–2001 is associated with an increase in deprivation in that area 
over 2001–2006. However, this result is not robust since it does not extend to either of the 
relationships estimated for the Auckland region. Furthermore, it is important to remember that 
our generated deprivation measure is not as closely linked to household characteristics as the 
Salmond et al. (2002) measure. For example, residents who purchased their home may then have 
more children, causing our measure of deprivation to increase for this area.
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The results in Tables 18 and 19, corresponding to Equation (17), indicate a strong, 
positive relationship between the percentage of homebuys over 1996–2001 and the change in 
house prices (and house prices relative to income) over 2001–2006. The result for New Zealand 
in Table 18 suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in homebuys in an area during 1996–2001 
is associated with a 2.7% increase in real house prices in that area over 2001–2006. Table 19 
finds, for New Zealand, that a 1 percentage point increase in homebuys in an area during 1996–
 It is therefore more 
useful to examine the effect of sales and acquisitions on house prices, as house price changes 
measure the change in the overall “amenity value” that purchasers attribute to a community.  
                                                 
24 The correlation between our deprivation measure and the mean number of 0–4 year olds in a private dwelling is 
0.70 for 2001. 21 
 
2001 is associated with a 2.3% increase in real house prices relative to real income in that area 
over 2001–2006. When examining just the Auckland region, the results in Tables 18 and 19 
indicate an even stronger positive relationship between the percentage of homebuys in an area 
and the change in local real house prices (and house prices relative to income).  
These homebuy results accord with the hypothesis that a change in the housing tenure 
status of a given resident from state tenant to homeowner (as occurred, by definition, with the 
Home Buy scheme) has positive spin-offs for the local community. These positive externalities 
are capitalised into a higher price of houses in the local area over and above what would have 
occurred due to the effects of our prior deprivation and house price control variables.  
The results for both New Zealand and Auckland suggest that vacant sales and 
acquisitions over 1996–2001 had little or no effect on subsequent house price changes (or 
changes in house prices relative to income) over 2001–2006. The acquisitions result is perhaps 
surprising given that acquisitions increase the measured deprivation of an area, consistent with 
the policy intent to provide homes for deprived people. The practice of “pepper-potting” 
acquired state houses amongst a broader community, as adopted over this period (mitigating 
intense concentrations of state housing), may be one reason that local house prices were broadly 
unaffected by acquisition patterns (Schrader, 2005). 
Vacant sales differ from homebuys in that, by definition, a vacant sale corresponds to a 
change in resident, whereas the resident remains the same with a homebuy. Some vacant sales 
resulted in a shift in tenancy status for the house from having a tenant to having a homeowner 
(i.e. of the new resident), but others resulted in sale of the house to a landlord, thereby replacing 
one tenant with another. Accordingly, compared with the Home Buy scheme, there is less reason 
to expect that vacant sales will lead to changing amenity values or deprivation levels in a 




New Zealand’s changing state housing policies over the two decades following 1990 gave rise 
to two natural experiments regarding the sales and acquisitions of state houses. The 1990s 
National government sought to reduce the overall state house stock and to redirect it away from 
non-deprived areas to areas most in need, while the post-1999 Labour government sought to 
increase the overall stock, often through acquiring new state houses in fringe urban areas. This 
paper uses state housing data provided by HNZC, population data from the 1986, 1991, 1996, 
2001 and 2006 censuses, and house price data from QVNZ, to explore the spatial distribution of 
sales and acquisitions of state houses over 1991–2006.  
We have examined the effect of deprivation and house prices on acquisitions and sales in an 
area over three inter-censal periods, 1991–1996, 1996–2001, and 2001–2006. Over the three 
periods, acquisitions generally occurred in deprived areas, where house prices and house prices 
relative to incomes were high. This latter, unexpected, relationship between acquisitions and 
house prices was most likely due to a large number of acquisitions occurring in the Auckland 
urban fringe where house prices, even in deprived areas, were high relative to the rest of New 
Zealand. Supporting this argument is the inverse relationship between acquisitions over 2001–
2006 and the change in house prices (and house prices relative to income) over 1996–2001. We 
placed a greater emphasis on the results for the change in house price variables (as opposed to 
house price levels) since the former control for unchanging amenity and location effects. The 
results based on house price changes are consistent with our hypotheses that high prices 
discouraged acquisitions and a greater number of acquisitions occurred in deprived areas. 
For vacant sales and homebuys we focused our attention on the results for the period 
1996–2001, as this is when the majority of each sale type occurred. We find that there was a 
greater number of vacant sales in areas of low deprivation with relatively low house prices and 
low house prices relative to income. We find no evidence to suggest that purchasers preferred to 
purchase larger houses versus smaller houses (based on bedroom numbers). However, the 
evidence indicates that purchasers preferred to purchase stand-alone dwellings rather than other 
property types. 
As hypothesised, we find that a greater number of homebuys occurred in less deprived 
areas with low house prices and low house prices relative to income. Furthermore, our results 
suggest that a greater number of homebuys occurred in areas where house prices and house 
prices relative to income had fallen in the recent past. We also find that, for a given set of state 
houses, residents were more likely to purchase their house in a less deprived area that was 23 
 
improving (in terms of deprivation) and where house prices and housing affordability had fallen 
in the past five years. When we further examined homebuys by house type we find that residents, 
on average, preferred to purchase larger, standalone houses. 
We also explored the area characteristics of the stock of state houses over time. As 
expected, higher densities of state houses were located in more deprived areas. There was no 
consistent relationship between the state housing stock and house prices. This reflects the fact 
that the majority of state houses had been acquired many decades before and so the current 
stock was unrelated to current house prices. 
Having determined which factors need to be controlled for with regard to the purchase 
decision, we were able to examine the impacts of sales and acquisitions on subsequent changes in 
deprivation and house prices in an area. As expected, areas which experienced an increase in 
acquisitions over 1996–2001 witnessed an increase in deprivation over 2001–2006. Areas that 
experienced a relatively high percentage of homebuys over 1996–2001 witnessed an increase in 
real median house prices (and real median house prices relative to income) over 2001–2006. 
These results are consistent both for New Zealand and for the Auckland Region. The results for 
the latter area, which are estimated across a more homogeneous housing market than the full 
New Zealand sample, suggest an even stronger positive relationship between homebuys and 
future house price increases in an area than indicated by the New Zealand results. Thus, after 
controlling for existing levels and prior changes in both deprivation and house prices, our results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that the sale of state houses to existing tenants had positive 
impacts on the local community, with this effect being capitalised into local house prices. 
Future work could extend these results to a unit record analysis of whether neighbouring 
properties benefit more from state house homebuy sales than do more distant properties. If so, 
this would suggest that observable characteristics of the house (e.g. mown lawns, house 
maintenance, etc.) or of the household (e.g. residents’ behaviour) may have changed as a result of 
the purchase decision. If the effect is spatially more diffuse, the neighbourhood benefits may 
reflect more of a changing social capital phenomenon whereby the purchaser participates more 
fully in local community activities such as Neighbourhood Watch (a local crime-reduction 
scheme) or assisting in school activities. New Zealand’s natural experiments with state housing, 
driven by differing political philosophies of alternating governments, therefore offer valuable 
opportunities to investigate the impacts that tenure status can have on individual and community 
outcomes. Our results suggest that the Home Buy scheme did affect community outcomes 
positively, but the exact source of those benefits is still yet to be determined. 24 
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Table 1: Acquisitions, Vacant Sales and Homebuys over the Three Census Periods 
  March 1993 - February 1996  March 1996 –February 2001  March 2001 - February 2006 
Acquisitions  273  2552  5774 
% of Total Acquisitions  3.17%  29.68%  67.15% 
Vacant Sales  1014  7718  644 
% of Total Vacant Sales  10.81%  82.32%  6.87% 
Homebuys  716  2387  10 
% of Total Homebuys  23.00%  76.68%  0.32% 
Notes: the percentages are expressed as the number of sales/acquisitions for the census period over the total number of 






Table 2: Population Characteristics in 2001 Census Area Units 
           
Variables (Means unless otherwise stated)  1986  1991  1996  2001  2006 
Local Population  1377  1443  1502  1562  1697 
Real median house price  139531  140205  173985  189305  314661 
Percent owning their own dwelling  73.9  74.5  72.2  70.1  69.2 
Percent unemployed or not in the labour force  35.8  42.2  37.2  35.7  32.1 
Age  42.3  43.0  44.0  45.5  46.2 
Percent aged 65 and over  13.7  14.4  15.0  15.9  16.4 
Number of 0–4 yr olds in private dwellings  0.26  0.26  0.25  0.22  0.21 
Number of 5–12 yr olds in private dwellings  0.42  0.36  0.37  0.37  0.34 
Number of 13–17 yr olds in private dwellings  0.30  0.24  0.22  0.21  0.23 
Number of 18–24 yr olds in private dwellings  0.50  0.46  0.40  0.35  0.36 
Number of 25–64 yr olds in private dwellings  1.60  1.61  1.63  1.62  1.62 
Number of 65+ yr olds in private dwellings  0.25  0.26  0.27  0.29  0.30 
Percent female  50.0  50.4  50.9  51.2  51.3 
Percent of migrants  17.0  17.2  18.3  19.6  22.2 
Percent European  87.3  85.7  85.2  82.7  81.1 
Percent Maori  10.6  11.2  13.0  12.8  13.3 
Percent Pacific Islander  2.5  3.0  3.5  3.8  4.0 
Percent Asian  1.3  2.2  3.5  4.6  6.3 
Percent Other Ethnicity  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.6 
Percent with no qualifications  38.7  33.3  34.3  25.6  24.2 
Percent with school qualifications  22.4  23.9  25.7  33.7  30.7 
Percent with post school qualifications  25.9  31.2  19.6  19.5  24.3 
Percent with degree  5.1  6.0  7.9  9.9  13.9 
Percent with missing qualifications  7.9  5.6  12.5  11.3  6.9 
Real income  22574  21595  25997  27753  30102 
Percent with zero or negative income  2.6  2.3  3.7  3.3  3.5 
Percent with missing income  4.9  4.1  5.6  7.4  6.1 
Percent never married  20.7  21.8  20.0  20.3  20.1 
Percent married  61.5  57.6  54.6  52.3  50.3 
Percent de facto  5.1  6.6  9.9  12.7  15.1 
Percent divorced or separated  6.1  7.4  6.8  7.7  7.9 
Percent widowed  6.4  6.5  5.8  6.0  5.5 
Percent missing marital status  0.2  0.0  2.9  1.0  1.1 
Percent with no family  24.5  25.6  25.2  28.3  26.2 
Percent couple with kids  45.9  41.6  38.9  34.7  35.1 
Percent couple with no kids  22.9  24.9  27.7  28.4  30.1 
Percent single with kids  6.7  7.9  8.2  8.6  8.6 
Observations  1645  1859  1859  1859  1859 
Notes: all population characteristics come from census data except for the real median house price with 




Table 3: Correlation Coefficients between Deprivation Variables & Area Characteristics for 2001 
   NZDep 2001 
deprivation score 
(generated) 
NZDep2001  1    
Deprivation score (generated)  0.8180  1 
Natural log of real income  -0.7917  -0.6011 
Percent with zero or negative income  0.0492  0.3767 
Percent with missing income  0.6830  0.7772 
Natural log of house prices  -0.3650  -0.0995 
Percent unemployed or not in the labour force  0.6911  0.4433 
Percent female  0.0939  -0.0005 
Percent of migrants  0.0228  0.3735 
Percent European  -0.7037  -0.9034 
Percent Maori  0.7028  0.6261 
Percent Pacific  0.4682  0.7143 
Percent Asian  -0.0155  0.2982 
Percent other ethnicity  0.0909  0.2376 
Percent with missing qualifications  0.7321  0.5309 
Percent with school qualifications  -0.4207  -0.0894 
Percent with post school qualifications  -0.6942  -0.6820 
Percent with a degree  -0.4467  -0.2365 
Mean age  -0.1519  -0.5423 
Percent of people aged 65+   0.0590  -0.3135 
Percent living in private dwelling  -0.1021  -0.1853 
Percent owning their own home  -0.5559  -0.6610 
Mean number of 0–4 year olds  0.4863  0.6951 
Mean number of 5–12 yr olds  0.3904  0.5423 
Mean number of 12–17 yr olds  0.2285  0.4101 
Mean number of 18–24 yr olds  0.2497  0.4725 
Mean number of 25–64 yr olds  -0.0653  0.2968 
Mean number of 65+ yr olds  0.0504  -0.2988 
Percent married  -0.6694  -0.6928 
Percent de facto  0.3933  0.4126 
Percent divorced/separated  0.5692  0.3345 
Percent widowed  0.2776  -0.0184 
Percent missing marital status  0.2633  0.4097 
Percent couple with kids  -0.3729  -0.1254 
Percent couple without kids  -0.5543  -0.8143 
Percent single with kids   0.7658  0.7080 




Table 4: Mean Percentage of Sales and Acquisitions over the Three Census Periods 
Percentage of Initial Total Private Dwellings 
   1991–1996  1996–2001 
2001–
2006 
Vacant Sales of State Houses  0.1030  0.7296  0.0573 
Vacant Sales of 1-2 Bedroom State Houses  0.0525  0.3272  0.0244 
Vacant Sales of 3+ Bedroom State Houses  0.0505  0.4026  0.0330 
Vacant Sales of Single Unit State Houses  0.0888  0.5126  0.0285 
Vacant Sales of Other Property Type State Houses  0.0145  0.2172  0.0289 
Homebuys of State Houses  0.0729  0.2257  0.0009 
Homebuys of 1-2 Bedroom State Houses  0.0163  0.0663  0.0006 
Homebuys of 3+ Bedroom State Houses  0.0566  0.1594  0.0003 
Homebuys of Single Unit State Houses  0.0695  0.2011  0.0004 
Homebuys of Other Property Type State Houses  0.0034  0.0246  0.0004 
Acquisitions of State Houses  0.0278  0.2412  0.5145 
Acquisitions of 1-2 Bedroom State Houses  0.0058  0.0513  0.2792 
Acquisitions of 3+ Bedroom State Houses  0.0220  0.1901  0.2353 
Acquisitions of Single Unit State Houses  0.0228  0.1822  0.2577 
Acquisitions of Other Property Type State Houses  0.0050  0.0591  0.2568 
Stock of State Houses  7.0604  6.4174  5.3165 
Stock of 1–2 Bedroom State Houses  3.1556  2.8717  2.3608 
Stock of 3+ Bedroom State Houses  3.9044  3.5456  2.9559 
Stock of Single Unit State Houses  4.5361  4.085  3.3090 
Stock of Other Property Type State Houses  2.5239  2.3323  2.0076 
Percentage of Initial State Housing Stock 
Vacant Sales of State Houses  3.4743  15.9493  2.3092 
Homebuys of State Houses  1.5033  4.2479  0.0114 
Percentage of 1-2 Bedroom State Houses 
Vacant Sales of 1–2 Bedroom State Houses  2.6240  14.8413  2.2167 
Homebuys of 1–2 Bedroom State Houses  0.5375  2.5078  0.0130 
Percentage of 3+ Bedroom State Houses 
Vacant Sales of 3+ Bedroom State Houses  3.8915  17.1932  2.4006 
Homebuys of 3+ Bedroom State Houses  2.2777  5.7705  0.0065 
Percentage of Single Unit State Houses 
Vacant Sales of Single Unit State Houses  4.2883  19.4162  2.0595 
Homebuys of Single Unit State Houses  2.0521  5.7377  0.0068 
Percentage of Other Property Type State Houses 
Vacant Sales of Other Property Type State Houses  1.1155  9.1608  2.1483 
Homebuys of Other Property Type State Houses  0.3854  1.488  0.0125 
Sample Size  1859  1859  1859 
Notes: the percentages are expressed firstly as a percentage of initial total private dwellings e.g. acquisitions during 1991–
1996 are expressed as a percentage of total private dwellings in 1991. The sales categories are also expressed as a 
percentage of initial state housing stock and as a percentage of initial state housing stock of each sub-category. For 
example the number of vacant sales of 1–2 bedroom state houses during 1996–2001 as a percentage of 1–2 bedroom state 
houses in 1996. 
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Table 5: Cross Sectional Regressions Examining the Relationship between Deprivation and each Category Expressed as a Percentage of Total Private 
Dwellings 
   Acquisitions  Vacant Sales  Homebuys 
   1991–1996  1996–2001 
2001–
2006  1991–1996  1996–2001  2001–2006  1991–1996  1996–2001  2001–2006 
Variables                            
Deprivation  0.00862*  0.105***  0.187***  -0.0279***  -0.184***  -0.000636  -0.0304***  -0.0343***  -0.000234* 
ΔDeprivation  -0.000956  0.0351  -0.122**  0.00408  -0.00321  0.00527  0.0121***  -0.0178**  -0.000916** 
State housing stock  0.000575*  0.00688  -0.00151  0.00940***  0.131***  0.00511***  0.0105***  0.0368***  0.000172*** 
Constant  0.0251***  0.148**  0.461***  0.0330***  -0.0612  0.0296***  0.00339  0.00947  0.000225 
                             
Observations  1,123  1,130  1,133  1,123  1,130  1,133  1,123  1,130  1,133 
R-squared  0.069  0.037  0.144  0.148  0.427  0.031  0.367  0.540  0.018 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All estimates are variance weighted by the total number of private dwellings in each CAU. 3% of acquisitions occurred 
during 1991–1996, 30% occurred during 1996–2001 and 67% occurred during 2001–2006. 11% of vacant sales occurred during 1991–1996, 82% occurred during 












Table 6: Cross Sectional Regressions Examining the Relationship between House Prices and each Category Expressed as a Percentage of Total 
Private Dwellings 
   Acquisitions   Vacant Sales   Homebuys 
   1991–1996  1996–2001  2001–2006  1991–1996  1996–2001  2001–2006  1991–1996  1996–2001  2001–2006 
Variables                            
Deprivation  0.00848  0.0948***  0.210***  -0.0288**  -0.196***  -0.00226  -0.0333***  -0.0331***  -0.000226 
Δ Deprivation  -0.000724  0.0206  -0.0956  0.00307  0.0308  -0.00469  0.0132***  -0.00603  -0.000921* 
ln(houseprice)  0.00155  0.132**  0.600***  -0.0579***  -0.383***  -0.0791***  -0.0149  -0.0629***  0.000555 
Δ ln(houseprice)  -0.000360  0.203  -0.533**  0.0136  -0.0248  -0.0631  0.0392  -0.196***  -0.000268 
State housing stock  0.000535  0.00939***  -0.00187  0.00962***  0.130***  0.00510***  0.0107***  0.0354***  0.000176*** 
Constant  0.00774  -1.504*  -6.794***  0.716***  4.553***  0.992***  0.180  0.808***  -0.00651 
                             
Observations  1,078  1,102  1,105  1,078  1,102  1,105  1,078  1,102  1,105 
R-squared  0.070  0.128  0.193  0.164  0.442  0.062  0.372  0.563  0.019 














Table 7: Cross Sectional Regressions Examining the Relationship between Housing Affordability and each Category Expressed as a Percentage of 
Total Private Dwellings. 
   Acquisitions  Vacant Sales  Homebuys 
   1991-1996  1996-2001  2001–2006  1991–1996  1996–2001  2001–2006  1991–1996  1996–2001  2001–2006 
Variables                            
Deprivation  0.00675  0.0894***  0.184***  -0.0190*  -0.186***  0.00133  -0.0305***  -0.0306***  -0.000246* 
Δ Deprivation  0.000179  0.00613  -0.117*  -0.00173  0.0722**  0.00665  0.0117***  0.00349  -0.000956** 
ln(houseprice/income)  0.00892  0.215**  0.830***  -0.100***  -0.786***  -0.101***  -0.0271*  -0.131***  0.000364 
Δ ln(houseprice/income)  0.0156  0.112  -0.657***  -0.00901  0.427*  -0.0589  0.0224  -0.0987*  -0.000182 
State housing stock  0.000507  0.00890**  -0.00344  0.00993***  0.132***  0.00540***  0.0107***  0.0358***  0.000174*** 
Constant  0.00911  -0.278  -1.135***  0.214***  1.386***  0.223***  0.0515**  0.260***  -0.000483 
                             
Observations  1,078  1,102  1,105  1,078  1,102  1,105  1,078  1,102  1,105 
R-squared  0.072  0.127  0.200  0.172  0.452  0.059  0.372  0.562  0.019 














Table 8: The Relationship between Deprivation and Sales Expressed as a Percentage of the State Housing Stock 
   Vacant Sales  Homebuys 
   1991–1996  1996–2001 
2001–
2006  1991–1996  1996–2001  2001–2006 
Variables                   
Deprivation  -1.648***  -2.021***  -0.241**  -0.592*  -0.307***  0.00125 
Δ Deprivation  0.626**  -1.256**  -0.243  0.275*  -0.787***  -0.0165** 
Constant  3.681***  17.50***  2.490***  1.649***  4.859***  0.0137*** 
                    
Observations  1,016  1,004  991  1,016  1,004  991 
R-squared  0.024  0.089  0.006  0.004  0.028  0.005 

















Table 9: The Relationship between House Prices and Sales Expressed as a Percentage of the State Housing Stock 
   Vacant Sales  Homebuys 
   1991–1996  1996–2001 
2001–
2006  1991–1996  1996–2001 
2001–
2006 
Variables                   
Deprivation  -1.075**  -2.095***  -0.269**  -0.618*  -0.302***  0.00194 
Δ Deprivation  0.311  -0.778  -0.531  0.297*  -0.686***  -0.0164** 
ln(houseprice)  1.007  -2.473  -1.468**  0.419  -0.0715  0.0167* 
Δ ln(houseprice)  -1.091  -3.522  -1.923  -0.333  -3.538**  -0.0307 
Constant  -8.635  47.60***  20.38**  -3.285  6.350  -0.188 
                    
Observations  990  991  979  990  991  979 
R-squared  0.031  0.095  0.014  0.005  0.036  0.009 
















Table 10: The Relationship between Housing Affordability and Sales Expressed as a Percentage of the State Housing Stock 
   Vacant Sales  Homebuys 
   1991-1996  1996–2001 
2001–
2006  1991–1996  1996–2001 
2001–
2006 
Variables                   
Deprivation  -0.979**  -1.939***  -0.177  -0.576*  -0.274***  0.00133 
Δ Deprivation  0.254  -0.104  -0.285  0.272  -0.576**  -0.0161** 
ln(houseprice/income)  0.0571  -6.335***  -2.431***  0.117  -0.279  0.0142 
Δ ln(houseprice/income)  -2.559  -4.466  -2.038  -1.196  -4.041**  -0.0323 
Constant  3.318*  29.09***  7.160***  1.524  5.446***  -0.0141 
                    
Observations  990  991  979  990  991  979 
R-squared  0.031  0.108  0.018  0.005  0.038  0.007 
















Table 11: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions for Vacant Sales and Homebuys of 1–2 Bedroom and 3+ Bedroom State Houses (as a Percentage of Stock 
of 1–2 Bedroom State Houses and 3+ Bedrooms State Houses, Respectively) 
   1996–2001 
   Vacant Sales  Homebuys 
Variables  1-2 Bedrooms  3+ Bedrooms  1-2 Bedrooms  3+ Bedrooms 
              
Deprivation  -1.895***  -2.225***  -0.185***  -0.541*** 
Δ Deprivation  -0.235  1.134*  -0.00551  -0.618* 
ln(houseprice/income)  -5.464**  -7.769***  0.292  2.199* 
Δ ln(houseprice/income)  -2.310  -4.839  -1.650  -7.211*** 
Constant  26.77***  31.82***  2.130*  2.513 
              
Observations  796  796  796  796 
R-squared  0.090  0.133  0.014  0.041 
Wald test (1)  0.2102  0.0012 
Wald test (2)  0.1121  0.0000 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All estimates are variance weighted by the total number of private dwellings in each CAU. 12% of vacant sales of 1–2 
bedroom houses occurred during 1991–1996, 81.5% occurred during 1996–2001 and 6.5% occurred during 2001–2006. 18% of homebuys of 1–2 bedroom houses 
occurred during 1991–1996, 81% occurred during 1996–2001 and 1% occurred during 2001–2006. 10% of vacant sales of 3+ bedroom houses occurred during 
1991–1996, 83% occurred during 1996–2001 and 7% occurred during 2001–2006. 25% of homebuys of 3+ bedroom houses occurred during 1991–1996, 75% 
occurred during 1996–2001 and <1% occurred during 2001–2006. Wald test (1) tests if all coefficients of the explanatory variables excluding the constant term are 









Table 12: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions for Vacant Sales and Homebuys of Single Unit and Other Property Type State Houses (as a Percentage of 
Stock of Single Unit State Houses and Other Property Type State Houses, Respectively) 
   1996 - 2001 
   Vacant Sales  Homebuys 
Variables  Single Unit  Other   Single Unit  Other 
              
Deprivation  -2.300***  -0.836***  -0.320***  -0.120 
Δ Deprivation  1.704**  -1.094  0.320  -0.884*** 
ln(houseprice/income)  -4.951*  -1.527  -0.0270  1.113 
Δ ln(houseprice/income)  -12.16**  -0.428  -5.377**  1.447 
Constant  28.69***  13.55***  6.025**  0.0610 
              
Observations  682  682  682  682 
R-squared  0.150  0.028  0.023  0.026 
Wald test (1)  0.0000  0.0000 
Wald test (2)  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All estimates are variance weighted by the total number of private dwellings in each CAU. 13% of vacant sales of single unit 
houses occurred during 1991–1996, 82% occurred during 1996–2001 and 5% occurred during 2001–2006. 24% of homebuys of single unit houses occurred during 
1991–1996, 76% occurred during 1996–2001 and <1% occurred during 2001–2006. 5% of vacant sales of other property types occurred during 1991–1996, 83% 
occurred during 1996–2001 and 12% occurred during 2001–2006. 11% of homebuys of other property types occurred during 1991–1996, 87% occurred during 
1996–2001 and 2% occurred during 2001–2006. Wald test (1) tests if all coefficients of the explanatory variables are the same across the two sub-categories, but 







Table 13: Cross Sectional Regressions Examining the Relationship between Deprivation and the 
State Housing Stock 
   State Housing Stock 
   1991  1996  2001  2006 
Variables             
Deprivation  1.979***  2.286***  2.089***  1.967*** 
Constant  7.611***  5.791***  4.416***  4.180*** 
              
Observations  1130  1133  1134  1133 
R-squared  0.305  0.410  0.470  0.474 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All estimates are variance weighted by the total number of private 
dwellings in each CAU. 
 
Table 14: Cross Sectional Regressions Examining the Relationship between House Prices and 
the State Housing Stock 
   State Housing Stock 
   1991  1996  2001  2006 
Variables             
Deprivation  2.018***  2.266***  2.094***  1.994*** 
ln(houseprice)  0.645  -1.087**  -0.0381  -0.319 
Constant  0.00862  18.92***  4.888  8.264 
              
Observations  1108  1115  1116  1109 
R-squared  0.310  0.417  0.472  0.487 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All estimates are variance weighted by the total number of private 
dwellings in each CAU. 
 
Table 15: Cross Sectional Regressions Examining the Relationship between Housing 
Affordability and the State Housing Stock 
   State Housing Stock 
   1991  1996  2001  2006 
Variables             
Deprivation  2.045***  2.309***  2.084***  1.999*** 
ln(houseprice/income)  5.313***  -0.649  0.613  0.208 
Constant  -2.321  7.063***  3.244***  3.749*** 
              
Observations  1108  1115  1116  1109 
R-squared  0.334  0.415  0.472  0.487 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All estimates are variance weighted by the total number of private 






Table 16: Relationship between the Change in Deprivation over 2006–2001 and the Percentage of 
Acquisitions, Homebuys and Vacant Sales over 1996–2001. 
Δ Deprivation06-01 
   NZ  Auckland 
Vacant Sales96-01/TPD96  -0.0185  -0.0301 
Homebuys96-01/TPD96  0.125**  0.0228 
Acquisitions96-01/TPD96  0.0398**  0.0374* 
Deprivation01  0.0227***  0.00974 
ΔDeprivation01-96  0.0885***  0.247*** 
ΔDeprivation96-91  0.0585***  0.0155 
ln(houseprice) 2001  0.461***  0.307* 
Δ ln(houseprice)01-96  -0.633***  -0.505 
Δ ln(houseprice)01-96  -0.426***  -0.521* 
Constant  -5.402***  -3.383* 
        
Observations  1094  262 
R-squared  0.165  0.152 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All estimates are variance weighted by the average population over 
1986–2006 in each CAU. 
 
Table 17: Relationship between the Change in Deprivation over 2006–2001 and the Percentage of 
Acquisitions, Homebuys and Vacant Sales over 1996–2001. 
Δ Deprivation06-01 
   NZ  Auckland 
Vacant Sales96-01/TPD96  -0.0135  -0.0268 
Homebuys96-01/TPD96  0.133***  0.0714 
Acquisitions96-01/TPD96  0.0386**  0.0320 
Deprivation01  0.000212  -0.0142 
Δ Deprivation01-96  0.103***  0.268*** 
ΔDeprivation96-91  0.0378**  0.000426 
ln(houseprice/income)01  0.447***  0.312 
Δ ln(houseprice/income)01-96  -0.401***  0.00238 
Δ ln(houseprice/income)96-91  -0.0888  0.0967 
Constant  -0.779***  -0.413 
        
Observations  1094  262 
R-squared  0.129  0.133 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All estimates are variance weighted by the average population over 







Table 18: Relationship between the Change in House Price over 2006–2001 and the Percentage of 
Acquisitions, Homebuys and Vacant Sales over 1996–2001. 
Δ ln(houseprice)06-01 
   NZ  Auckland 
Vacant Sales96-01/TPD96  -0.00130  0.000616 
Homebuys96-01/TPD96  0.0271**  0.0590** 
Acquisitions96-01/TPD96  0.00146  0.000423 
Deprivation01  -0.00984***  -0.00877*** 
Δ Deprivation01-96   -0.0208***  -0.0258*** 
Δ Deprivation96-91  0.00637*  0.00180 
ln(houseprice)01  -0.127***  -0.122*** 
Δ ln(houseprice)01-96  -0.277***  -0.178*** 
Δ ln(houseprice)96-91  0.0809***  0.135*** 
Constant  2.029***  1.942*** 
        
Observations  1078  262 
R-squared  0.363  0.268 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All estimates are variance weighted by the average population over 
1986–2006 in each CAU. 
 
 
Table 19: Relationship between the Change in House Price Relative to Income over 2006–2001 
and the Percentage of Acquisitions, Homebuys and Vacant Sales over 1996–2001. 
Δ ln(houseprice/income)06-01 
   NZ  Auckland 
Vacant Sales96-01/TPD96  -0.00467*  -0.00514 
Homebuys96-01/TPD96  0.0228**  0.0455** 
Acquisitions96-01/TPD96  0.00219  0.00307 
Deprivation01  -0.00115  -0.000572 
Δ Deprivation01-96   0.00759  0.0124 
Δ Deprivation96-91  0.0115***  0.00106 
ln(houseprice/income)01  -0.143***  -0.134*** 
Δ ln(houseprice/income)01-96 
-
0.345***  -0.294*** 
Δ ln(houseprice/income)96-91  -0.0119  -0.000562 
Constant  0.671***  0.635*** 
        
Observations  1078  262 
R-squared  0.368  0.255 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All estimates are variance weighted by the average population over 
1986–2006 in each CAU. 
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